The Effect of Deviation from Optimal Cash Level on Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Firms Listed on Tehran Stock Exchange

Document Type: Research Paper


Faculty of Economics and Management, Urmia University, Urmia, Iran


This study aims to investigate the impact of deviation from optimal level of cash holdings on adverse selection and moral hazard problems. The data set includes 106 listed firms of Tehran Stock Exchange during the period of 2005-2016 and both panel data and cross-sectional data multivariate regressions were utilized in different stage of analysis to test the hypotheses. According to the optimal level of cash holdings, firms were divided into two groups of firms with or without excess cash holdings. The results of the study revealed that lower optimal level of cash holdings increases adverse selection. In addition, higher optimal level of cash holdings leads to moral hazard. In other words, the findings confirmed both pecking order and free cash flow theories. The findings imply that there is a positive relationship between information asymmetry and marginal value of cash holdings. Such a relationship will gradually decrease when the firms hold higher than optimal level of cash and translate into a negative one.


Main Subjects

Article Title [Persian]

تاثیر انحراف از سطح مطلوب وجه نقد بر مشکلات گزینش نادرست و خطر اخلاقی در شرکت‌های پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران

Authors [Persian]

  • سمیرا جودی
  • غلامرضا منصورفر
  • حمزه دیدار
دانشکده مدیریت واقتصاد، دانشگاه ارومیه، ارومیه، ایران
Abstract [Persian]

در بازارهای ناکارا و در شرایط وجود عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی، شرکت‌ها به نگهداری وجه نقد تمایل زیادی دارند. با این وجود گاهی نگهداری وجه نقد بیش از سطح مطلوب بدلیل مشکلات نمایندگی، هزینه فرصت را افزایش داده و از سویی نگهداشت وجه نقد کمتر از سطح مطلوب هزینه‌های کسری به شرکت تحمیل می‌کند. بنابراین در بازار ناکارا انحراف از سطح مطلوب وجه نقد اثرات منفی زیادی در پی دارد. در چنین شرایطی چگونگی بکارگرفتن وجوه داخلی، تصمیمی مهم در تضاد بین مدیران و سرمایه‌گذاران بیرونی محسوب می‌شود. بنابراین هدف اصلی این پژوهش بررسی تاثیر انحراف از سطح مطلوب وجه نقد بر افزایش مشکلات گزینش نادرست و خطر اخلاقی در شرکت‌های پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران می‌باشد. برای آزمون فرضیه‌های پژوهش بر اساس سطح مطلوب نگهداشت وجه نقد، شرکت‌ها به دو گروه شرکت‌های دارای وجه نقد مازاد و شرکت‌های فاقد وجه نقد مازاد تقسیم شدند. نتایج نشان داد نگهداشت وجه نقد کمتر از سطح مطلوب، موجب افزایش مشکلات گزینش نادرست و همچنین نگهداشت وجه نقد بیشتر از سطح مطلوب موجب افزایش مشکلات خطر اخلاقی می‌شود. به عبارتی دیگر نتایج پژوهش مؤید نظریه سلسله مراتبی و نظریه جریان وجه نقد آزاد می‌باشد. به این صورت که ارتباط مثبتی بین عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی و ارزش نهایی نگهداشت وجه نقد وجود دارد ولی زمانی که شرکت‌ها وجه نقد بیش از سطح مطلوب نگهداری می‌کنند ارتباط مثبت بین عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی و ارزش نهایی نگهداشت وجه نقد به تدریج کاهش می‌یابد و به ارتباط منفی تبدیل می‌شود.

Keywords [Persian]

  • سطح مطلوب وجه نقد
  • عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی
  • گزینش نادرست
  • خطر اخلاقی
  • ارزش نهایی نگهداشت وجه نقد
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